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Abstract
This essay is a critical exploration ofKwame Anthony Appiah's race theory. I
examine the two d istinct projects that make up this theory. The first project is an
analytical project in which he utilizes method s from the philosophy of language to
examine our beliefs about race. Furthermore, he attempts to d iscover whether there is
anything that correspond s to these beliefs about race. The second project is normative.
In this project, he asserts based on the analysis from his first project that there are no
human races. He offers solutions on how to approach race, racial id entity, and racism
given the fact that races d o not exist. Several criticisms of Appiah 's theory are also
examined as well as the liberal found ations that und ergird his analysis.
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Introduction
In American society, race is considered to be a valid and generally
uncontroversial system ofhuman categorization. In fact, many ofus have great pride for
our respective racial groups. We often consider race to be a relevant factor in
constructing our private and social lives. For instance, we make reference to race when
trying to determine the population(s) from which we choose our :friendships and life
partners or when deciding what clothes, music, cars, and houses we are going to
purchase. Sometimes, race is even a consideration when it comes to deciding what and
where we should teach our children. Race, in essence, is simply a fact ofAmerican life.
Ofcourse, we have seen a change in our societal views towards race. We tend to
be cautious in how we refer to particular races. Terminologies that were in the past
commonplace today are considered obscene. Yet contradictions still exist. While we
have race specific TV channels and products marketed specifically toward blacks, the
images and products being sold still reflect the old ways oflooking at blacks as violent,
hypersexual misogynists. Perhaps it is time for us to ask ourselves "Why after so many
years ofdealing with race it is still such an important aspect of our daily lives and
conception ofself?"
There have been many attempts to understand the nature ofthe race phenomena in
Western society. While other philosophers attempt to explore race in socio-historical,
classist, metaphysical, or scientific contexts, Kwame Anthony Appiah offers a different
approach. He seeks to explain the concept ofrace in hopes of understanding its journey
into the American vernacular and societal consciousness. The purpose ofthis essay will
be to explore Appiah's critical race theory. It will be demonstrated why Appiah arrives at
the conclusion that "there are no races."

In Chapter 1, I will present an exegesis of Appiah's racial theory. I shall explore
Appiah's usage of two methods borrowed from the philosophy oflanguage for his racial
analysis: the ideational and referential views of meaning. These two methods encompass
the analytical project in his theory. I will first follow Appiah as he utilizes the ideational
method and takes a historical journey into the past in an attempt to understand how
thinkers once talked about race. This will allow us to better understand how our current
understanding ofrace came into being. Secondly, I will explore Appiah's use ofthe
referential method, in which he attempts to seek out a referent in the world that matches
our past and current beliefs about race. As we shall see, race is unique insofar as it has
maintained power and become an often-dominating force in many of our lives while
lacking ideational coherence and objective validity. This, in itself, differentiates it from
more arbitrary terms ofcategorization. During my exposition, I shall briefly offer some
ofmy own concerns about Appiah's methodology. Furthermore, I will also examine the
second project of his theory. In this normative project, Appiah offers assertions
regarding racialism, racism, racial identity, as well as his conclusion that we may need to
put to rest the idea of race as a substantive part ofwho we are.
Chapter 2 ofthis essay will take up some of the concerns offered by Appiah's
critics.

First, I will examine at some length Paul C. Taylor's criticisms ofboth Appiah's

analytical and normative projects. Taylor takes issue with Appiah's claims that past race
talk was steeped in racial essentialism and also Appiah' s suggestion that we should
possibly move beyond racial identities. Secondly, I will address the concerns ofMichelle
Moody-Adams, who offers a different line of criticism ofAppiah's suggestion that we do
away with racial identities. In this chapter, I will suggest possible accommodations as
well as rebuttals to these criticisms. I will close this chapter with my own line of
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criticism in which I contend that Appiah treads too lightly when he offers a tentative
endorsement of racial identities only then to go on to assert that we must ultimately move
beyond these identities.
In Chapter 3, I will briefly examine Appiah's liberal foundations and demonstrate
how they are used as a basis for both his racial analysis and subsequent rejection of race.
The focus of this section will be Appiah's moral and political commitment to liberalism.
I will attempt to show that Appiah's liberalism coupled with the liberal vision of Amy
Gutmann provides for a better understanding of the overall aims and applicability of
Appiah's theory. If we better understand his moral and political commitments, we will
better understand his conclusions.
I will conclude this essay by offering some final thoughts explaining why I think
that we should endorse both Appiah's quest for truth and his rejection of race.

3

Chapter 1: Appiah's Theory
Section 1.1: Introduction
The crux ofKwame Anthony Appiah's race theory is found in the essay entitled
"Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections." This essay appears in the book

Color Conscious: The Political Morality ofRace. As I have stated, this race theory
consists oftwo distinct projects. The first project is both analytical and sociological. In
this project he seeks to explore the foundations ofour societal views regarding race.
Many racial theorists and activists have inadvertently endorsed the presupposition that
race is a legitimate entity by focusing primarily on the consequences ofrace in society,

e.g. racism. Appiah holds, however, ifwe are to speak ofthe effects of race in Western
society, then it is important that we first understand the meaning ofrace and that we
explore the validity ofrace as an objective and valid system of categorization. It is at this
foundational level that Appiah focuses the analytical project.
The second project of Appiah's race theory is normative. Appiah offers three
key conclusions resulting from his analysis of race. These three conclusions serve as
both the essay's thesis and what I take to be the heart ofhis overall race theory. The first
assertion is that "American social distinctions cannot be understood in terms ofthe
concept ofrace." 1 According to Appiah, our current views on race are a misinformed
hybridization ofsemantics, metaphysics, and science. He will term this hybridization
"racialism." Appiah will contend there are no human races, just the human race itself. 2
Race and even racism are the products of racialism and thereby should be understood as
such.
1

Appiah, Kwame Anthony and Amy Gutmann. Color Conscious. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1996.p.32
2
Ibid.
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Secondly, he holds that since race is not a legitimate entity, "culture" is not an
adequate replacement for the social distinctions that we attribute to race. Instead Appiah
will offer a tentative endorsement of the term "racial identity" as a more suitable
alternative to "race." However, he further concludes that even "racial identity" is
ultimately an unsuitable means to negate race-based discriminatory ideology within the
American paradigm. He states,
"...that there is a danger in making racial identities too central to our conceptions
of ourselves: while there is a place for racial identities in a world shaped by
racism, I shall argue, ifwe are to move beyond racism we shall have, in the end,
to move beyond current racial identities." 3
Since we hold race so central to our identities, Appiah's conclusions will likely appear
controversial at first glance. However, his analysis and dismantling of "race" will
demonstrate that these assertions must be strongly considered if we are to take the
autonomy, freedom, and dignity of persons seriously in liberal society. Let us now begin
our exploration of Appiah's analysis.
Section 1.2: Appiah's Methodology

Race related issues are generally subjects examined by the ethics-related areas of
philosophy such as social and political philosophy. While these disciplines have been
somewhat successful in illuminating racial problems, Appiah believes that in order to
adequately engage in an inquiry that will provide a more holistic picture of race, a more
sophisticated philosophical toolbox is needed. He states, ''technical philosophy can be of
the greatest help in clarifying our moral predicament; and to show that what can be
helpful lies as much in the spheres of metaphysics and epistemology and philosophy of
3

Ibid.
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language as it does in the field of ethics."4 Thus, Appiah chooses two primary methods
borrowed from the philosophy of language to achieve his analytical goals.
The first of these methods is the ideational theory of meaning derived from 1 ? 1h
century philosophy.

5

Appiah's version of this theory is a variation of British philosopher

Frank Ramsey's approach, which Appiah refers to as a "strict criteria! theory."6 Ramsey's
ideational theory requires that we gather people's beliefs about words. Those criteria!
beliefs will act as rules for understanding the meaning of words in the context of a given
community. To hold these criteria! beliefs that correspond to a particular word is to
understand what that words means. The reason that this criteria! theory is considered
"strict" is that for an object to be denoted by a particular term, all of the criteria! beliefs
must be true of that object.7 Let us take, for example, the word "bald." If we were to
gather the criteria! beliefs about "bald" within American society, then we might produce
beliefs such that bald denotes having little or no hair or consisting of a smooth surface.
One who believes that "bald" denotes these beliefs can be said to understand the meaning
of "bald" as spoken in the English language. Under the strict criteria! theory, we would
then look to the world to see if anything satisfies all of the criteria of those beliefs. If a
candidate is found that satisfies all of the criteria, then we can assert that such a thing
exists. If we find that nothing satisfies the criteria, then the logical conclusion is that such
a thing does not exist. Hypothetically, finding an object in the world that meets all the
criteria for "bald" under Ramsey's ideational view could be potentially easy, given the
criteria! beliefs that I have provided. All that would be needed is to find an object that 1)

4

Ibid., p. 33
Ibid.
6
Ibid., p. 35
7
Ibid., p. 35-36
5

6

has little or no hair and 2) has a smooth surface. Under the strict criteria} view all the
criteria are satisfied. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that "bald[ ness]" exists.
According to Appiah, if we were to utilize Ramsey's strict criteria} theory,
proving that races do not exist could be quite simple. All that would be necessary is that
we would find a criteria that all of us believe to be true about races and demonstrate that
there is nothing that satisfies that criteria.

8

Furthermore, in regard to race, some of our

criteria} beliefs are often substantively different or even contradictory. For instance,
some people may hold that race is purely a social construct while others believe human
races to be a biological fact. Competing criteria} beliefs lessens the effectiveness of a
strict criteria} theory. If one person were to believe that a race is and only is A and
another person were to believe that a race is and only is not A, the conclusion under the
strict criteria} theory would be that the persons who hold each of these particular beliefs
do not understand the meaning of race. 9 The strict criteria} theory requires universal
endorsement of all criteria} beliefs to determine meaning.
Appiah holds that it may indeed be possible to find criteria} beliefs that are both
necessary and sufficient to understand race. These beliefs would be ones that "everybody
who understands the word 'race' must have and such that everybody who has them
understands the concept of race."

10

However, if such criteria} beliefs existed, they could

also prove to be problematic under a strict criteria} theory. He goes on to say that if,
" ... these rather uncontroversial looking claims tum out to be ones that can be
denied by some who understands the word "race," then one might begin to

8

Ibid., pp. 34-37
Ibid., p. 36
10
Ibid.

9
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wonder whether any claims tum out to be necessary: and if none are necessary
then certainly the conjunction of necessary conditions won't be sufficient." 11
To avoid these problems that could arise from using a strict criterial theory for his
analysis, Appiah opts instead for what he calls a "vague criterial theory." He posits the
following definition for his theory: "race is something that satisfies a good number of the
criterial beliefs."12 He suggests that even a vague criterial theory has its problems. It
accompanies with it the fact that criterial beliefs are not universally held (implicit in the
idea of"a good number"). Despite this drawback, Appiah contends that a vague criterial
theory is useful for his analytical project. He states that it will allow us "to explore the
sorts of things people believe about what they call 'races' and to see what races would
have to be like for these things to be true of them." Furthermore, a vague criterial theory
"permits us to inquire as to whether the current science suggests there is something in the
world like that." 13 If there are no objects in the world that satisfy the vague criteria, then,
as with the strict criteria, we must conclude that there are no races. For Appiah, however,
such a conclusion would not negate the necessity for such an investigation. He contends
that it is still important that we understand the beliefs that we hold and the culture
surrounding those beliefs even if these beliefs tum out to be in error. 14 What is implicit
in Appiah's view here is that even false beliefs can have cultural ramifications and
consequences. 15 Therefore, we can see how Appiah's methodology allows for both an
analytic and sociological inquiry.

11

Ibid.
lbid. He credits his altering ofRamsey's theory to Wittgenstein's conception ofa criterion.
13
Ibid., p. 37
14
Ibid., p. 38
15
This will be of great importance when we turn our discussion towards racialism, extrinsic racism, and
intrinsic racism.
12

8

Appiah takes a historical approach in his ideational theory. A historical ideational
method permits us to trace the ideational views of persons in the past to those in the
present thus providing Appiah the means to demonstrate that the concept of race is not a
series of constant historical conjunctions. In other words, some may argue that our past
ways of thinking about race are distinctly different than current ways. Appiah's
ideational method will be able to test the validity of such a claim by demonstrating that
our current ways of thinking about race are actually a continuation or evolution of old
ways.
This ideational method is used in conjunction with a second primary method, a
version of the "causal theory of reference". 16 For Appiah, this theory represents an
"intersection of the philosophy oflanguage and the philosophy of science." 17 The
version of the referential theory that Appiah chooses to utilize will tell us that if we are to
find out what a word means then we need to explore the "best causal explanation of the
central features of uses of that word."18 He explains that under this theory ifwe want to
know what a particular term means then we need to look to the world to find the object to
which that term refers or that evokes the usage of that term. So, for example, if we want
to know the meaning of "bald" then we need only find the object that caused the
inception of the term "bald" or that thing in which persons first referred to as "bald."
Similarly,. a referential account of race will require that we do a historical investigation of
the word "race" so that we are able to find the object that was its initial cause.

19

An

investigation of this sort will allow us to bring clarity to our current usage of the term. If
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Ibid., p. 39
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
9
I Ibid., p. 40
17

9

through the course of the investigation it is found that no referent for race exists, then
under referential theory we must conclude that races do not exist.
Appiah acknowledges that there are past examples in which thinkers were
mistaken when speaking of objects. Intellectuals would often give terms to particular
objects believing them to be a certain kind of thing that turned out to be different in
nature. Appiah offers two historical examples of this occurrence: British chemist Sir
Humphrey Davy who used the term "acid" to denote what turned out to be "proton
donors" and French philosopher Rene Descartes who denoted the term "animal spirits" as
existing in our nerve fibers when in actuality what really existed were "truths about
sodium pumps and lipid bilayers and synapses. "20 In both of these cases these thinkers
were guilty of making descriptive errors about objects that turned out to be more complex
than they were aware. These errors are attributable to the scientific limitations of their
respective times.
In regard to "race," if it turns out that the criteria! beliefs that are collected are
mistaken, the referential theory will again prove itself useful. Appiah states that it
permits us to "explore the history of the way the word "race" has been used and see if we
can identify through that history some objective phenomenon that people were
responding to when they said what they said about races. "21
We can see that the ideational and referential theories have a symbiotic
relationship in Appiah's racial analysis. Indeed, Appiah asserts that each of these
methods necessitates the other's usage. He states that the "referential theory requires that
we do a historical version of what the ideational theory permits us to do. On the
20
21

Ibid., pp. 38-40
Ibid., p. 40
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referential theory, exploring the history of the term is central to understanding what it
means. Semantical considerations thus steer us toward a historical inquiry."22 An
inquiry using both of these methods meets Appiah's technical standards. The ideational
approach should reveal not only our beliefs about race, but also the complex natures of
those beliefs. Furthermore, we will be permitted to see whether or not there is anything
that exists that both evoked and that can accommodate such complexities.
So, Appiah's approach offers us much in the way of tangible value. It will give us
the object of race itself by requiring that on the ideational approach we find an actual
object that corresponds to our beliefs about race. Similarly, with the referential view the
imperative is that we search for an object that corresponds to race. This will allow
Appiah to provide both an analysis and an adequate normative solution that will be better
suited than those theories that 1) assume the existence of race, 2) give power to our
pragmatic beliefs, regardless of their validity, that have managed to survive only because
we hold these beliefs to be true and 3) that seem to disregard the findings of science.
Before beginning his ideational and referential analysis of race, Appiah seeks to
find subjects that will be best suited for this investigation. As mentioned before, the
word "race" as it is used in the common vernacular will likely provide a broad and
sometimes conflicting collection of criteria! beliefs in Western society. For instance, one
race is considered by some to be a social construct that has, over time, gained fictional
meaning and subsequent societal acceptance. This is not, however, a popular view in
western society. Most people likely feel that race reflects some undeniable biological,
morai or cultural reality about persons. We can now understand the benefits from
Appiah's choice of a historical version of the ideational method. It prevents having to sift
22

Ibid., p. 41
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through the ambiguity and conflict that would occur when collecting criteria! beliefs. It
makes it possible to collect past societal criteria! beliefs about race because ultimately, as
Appiah states, our "current ways of talking about race are the residue, the detritus, so to
speak, of earlier ways of thinking about race. "23
Appiah narrows the scope of this investigation to persons who would have been
considered the elite thinkers of the past. These intellectuals were regarded as the leading
authorities of their time and would have had great influence in their respective societies
because of their expertise. Focusing on intellectuals of the past will allow us to witness
the term being applied in what were thought at the time as appropriate ways. The term
"race," according to Appiah, was regarded as a scientific term. Appiah concentrates his
study on two great thinkers of the past, Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold.

24

In sum, Appiah recognizes that race is an important aspect of our lives. He
believes that if we are to understand the nature of race then it is important that we
understand our beliefs about race. However, he holds that our current beliefs about race
are inherited from past generations. Therefore, Appiah constructs a method borrowing
parts of both the ideational and referential views of meaning that will allow us to explore
the origin of our views about race. Then, we will be able discover whether there were
objects to which those beliefs correspond. Let us now examine Appiah's methodology in
application.

23
24

Ibid., p. 38
Ibid., p. 41
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Section 1.3: Race and ldeational Method

Thomas Jefferson believed that blacks are entitled to liberty. However, he felt that
whites and blacks could not exist in harmony under a sovereign political rule.25 His fear
was that the consequences of long running animosities between what he considered the
two different races of people would cause social unrest. Jefferson felt the white race
would continue to harbor prejudices against the black race, while blacks, unable to forget
the oppression brought against them by whites, would continue to hold animosity. This
would only exacerbate the already existing tensions between them, further dividing the
races, and thereby bring about social instability.26 Jefferson's views in this regard
demonstrate both the cultural and social dimension of his beliefs about race. The
invocation of race to mark pre-existing socio-cultural groups, then, seems practical in
regard to these potentially socially destabilizing events.
However, Jefferson's analysis goes far beyond merely describing two groups
potentially at odds for socially contingent reasons. He goes on to make biological and
moral claims about the characteristics of blacks and even suggests that these
characteristics could cause further instability between the two races. Appiah notes that
Jefferson
"... continues to talk about physical matters and their aesthetic consequences
hairlessness, kidneys, sweat-before moving on to discuss questions of the moral
character of the Negro--bravery, lustfulness, crudeness of feeling (no "tender,
delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation"), shallowness (those transient
Ibid., p. 43. It is important to note here we have a setting of the stage on how liberal ideology is coupled
with racial ideology that perhaps facilitates a means for oppression to exist in a liberal democracy for
reason not of hate. This leads me to believe that the use of Thomas Jefferson serves an even greater
symbolic purpose than that represented in Appiah 's thesis in "Color Conscious" coupled with his
affirmation of the liberal tradition.
26 I
bid . , p. 44

25
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griefs)-and ends, at last, with the intellectual capacities-or rather, incapacities of
black people." 27
In addition, one's race, indicated by phenotype, determined one's physical beauty as well
as her artistic and literary capabilities. For Jefferson, these factors were bound and given
mandate by nature. Appiah holds, then, that Thomas Jefferson used race not only to
denote a phenomenon that is cultural and social, but also to denote biological objects. 28
Appiah points out, however, that biology was not a discipline in Thomas
Jefferson's time. Rather, intellectuals like Jefferson drew upon what is called "natural
history. " This field lacked the rigorous discipline and sophistication of contemporary
science and therefore combined the culturaL psychological, physical variables as
demonstrated by Jefferson's own words. 29 So, it is understandable why Jefferson
believed race to be the indicator of some kind of natural essence--a racial essence. For
Jefferson, this essence binds members of groups together and makes them distinguishable
from other groups in ways that transcend the biological and move into the moral, literary,
and aesthetic realms.
Jefferson 's way of thinking about race is what Appiah refers to as "racialism." It
is the idea that ''we could divide human beings into a small number of groups, called
'races, ' in such a way that the members of these groups shared certain fundamental,
heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics with one another that
they did not share with members of any other race."30

27

Ibid., p.48
Ibid., pp. 43, 49
29
Ibid., p. 49
30
Ibid., p. 54

28
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For Appiah, racialism is even more pronounced a century after it was heralded by
Jefferson, most notably by the late 1 9th century British intellectual Matthew Arnold.
Arnold, along with his some of his contemporaries, believed that race explained both the
variation of physical characteristics and the moral and literary dispositions of groups.
Furthermore, such characteristics could be hybridized as a result ofbiological
intermingling between these groups. For Arnold, one could look to the literature and see
the essences of the various races that have combined to make up the English race. In
other words, the moral qualities exhibited by particular groups, both positive and
negative, would be passed down through generations by way of miscegenation. The
mixing of races in this regard would exhibit itself stylistically in English literature.3 1
English literature, for example, represented the combining of the genetic makeup of
Celtic and Saxon ancestries, rather than cultural or social intermingling. Like Thomas
Jefferson's racialism, Arnold's racialism demonstrates the passing on and mixing of
racial essences that extend beyond our physiology and into the products of our artistic
creation.
Appiah points out another important manifestation of Matthew Arnold's
racialism, a solid racialist structure. Arnold is able to make appeals to both intra-racial
and inter-racial similarities when explaining, for example, distinctions between groups
like the Saxons and Celts who fall into the "Indo-European" racial paradigm. Groups
may appear phenotypically different, but a common racial essence exhibited through
literature and character would be apparent. With this example, Arnold is using race to
assert sameness between groups. This bears similarity in structure to the American racial
paradigm. Appiah states,
31

Ibid., pp. 56-57
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"When we need differences, we can move lower down the taxonomic tree.
In the United States, the differences between Irish and Anglo-Saxons could be
used to account for the cultural and moral deficiencies-real or imaginary-of
Irish immigrants: but their whiteness could be used to distinguish them from the
Negro."32
Appiah holds that the racialism of Arnold is problematic for several reasons. One
of these is that Arnold lacks an inheritance theory that would explain how exactly
physiological, moral, and cultural characteristics are passed on and mixed through
interbreeding. Furthermore, there is no explanation of how to distinguish the impact of
nature and nurture when trying to distinguish or to predict racial characteristics. We are
also left asking as to how racial essences (nature) take precedence over the external
effects of cultural influences (nurture)? Arnold's racialism is unsupported and even
contradicted by what was known in science about biological interactions at the time.
Appiah states, "Without answers to questions such as these, however, what is
masquerading as an empirical, even a scientific, theory is remarkably insensitive to
evidence. "33
Up to this point, Appiah has demonstrated that the inheritance of racial essences
was both incoherent and scientifically ignorant. However, racialism remained widely
accepted in society. Intellectuals, given the limited tools of science and culture of the
day, managed to further complicate the meaning of race. Furthermore, he has
demonstrated that the racialist paradigm gained a certain amount of structure from the
18th century well into the 19th century.
32
33

Ibid., p. 59
Ibid., p. 61
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This is not to say that Appiah's analysis, thus far, is without fault. It was
previously stated that Appiah ho Ids that our current societal ideas about race are the
"residue" of intellectuals of the past. However, Appiah's theory lacks a strong inheritance
theory of its own--one that will answer the question in what ways and how have the
racialist structures of Jefferson's and Arnold's time survived into the present? It could
be argued that "race" of the past reflects something very different than race today. An
inheritance theory would demonstrate how metaphysics and bad science have remained
in the social consciousness over time. Modem day examples of race-talk that directly
reflect the criteria} beliefs of Jefferson and Arnold would provide a solid link from past to
present racial ideology. There is no doubt that such examples would shed light on the
claim that current beliefs about race, not just the term "race" itself, are connected to these
oId beliefs.
Indeed, there are many modem examples of the racialism of Jefferson and Arnold.
Consider that some regard one's race as a reliable indicator for natural musical adeptness.
For instance, it is a common assertion that persons designated as members of the black
race have some metaphysical characteristic called "rhythm" or "soul" thought to be fixed
by nature. A second example is that blacks are often thought to have some type of
natural athletic prowess as reflected in the often-made claim that black people are
naturally gifted at running, basketball, footbati etc. Other examples can take a more
negative spin, such as the claim that blacks are intellectually inferior, violent, or
hypersexual. This is not to say that Appiah does not recognize that these types of
examples exist in contemporary ideology, as we shall later see. However, he falls short
in his analysis by failing to present a more complete and compelling account of race
despite the fact that the ideational approach would allow for it. By not answering the
17

question "What is race for people today?" Appiah's analysis is incomplete. His claim
that our current ways of thinking about races are the "residue" of old ways is, therefore,
not fully convincing. After all, some will claim that over time this residue has been
sanitized. However, given that examples like the ones I have offered exist and are in fact
commonly held beliefs, Appiah's view is not dismissible.
It is possible that Appiah intentionally omitted an inheritance theory. A reason
for this could be the position that after exposing the historical origin of our beliefs as
false, our current views can be discredited. Then we have sufficient reason to move
beyond our current criteria! beliefs, as they too would lack proper grounding. He
succeeds in showing Jefferson' s and Arnold's criteria! beliefs were, at best, speculation
masquerading as science. If we take this along with their unwarranted metaphysical
assumptions and non-rigorous anthropological theorizing, there is enough evidence to
show that these criteria! beliefs are, at best, fictional. Moreover, there is insufficient
reason to suppose that these historical fictions became legitimate facts over time.
Appiah shows that the racialism of Jefferson's era did not seem to wane as it
moved into Arnold's era. The latter era was one in which science was both more
developed and sophisticated. However, progress in science is not reflected in Arnold's
views. His race-talk proved more fantastic and speculative than Jefferson's. We can
infer, then, that race became an entity that began to divorce itself from science. It
remained scientific mainly in the sense that it was believed that biological, moral, and
metaphysical characteristics were still fixed in nature.
Based on Appiah's ideational analysis, we can further conclude that Jefferson's
and Arnold's confused racial criteria! beliefs continued to be passed on culturally while
remaining, to a large degree, scientifically unchecked. Therefore, there is not sufficient
18

reason to think that our current beliefs about race are any less confused than those of the
elite thinkers of the past. Rather, the evolution of Jefferson's more scientifically based
beliefs to Arnold's more speculative ones, make it probable that our current beliefs about
race are even more confused than in the times of their origin. After all, this transition
represents an expansion from what are considered racial characteristics (moral and
intellectual characteristics) as being marked by phenotype to also being marked by the
products of human creation. Hence, Appiah's claim that the current ways that we talk
about race simply shadow old ways is quite plausible after all.
The ideational theory has allowed us to see that the criteria} beliefs of the experts
from whom we inherited our current beliefs were erroneous and therefore warrant the
conclusion that races do not exist. Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold thought they
were examining races. At best they were picking out shared characteristics amongst
often-isolated groups of people and attributing those characteristics to broader groups.
They were, in essence, creating races. In modem times, this would be something akin to
attributing characteristics of some African Americans to all persons considered to be
black and characteristics of some Irish Americans to all persons considered white. The
fact is that our past beliefs about race are simply not supported by contemporary science.
Appiah states, "People are the product not of essences but of genes interacting with one
another and with environments, and there is little systematic correlation between genes
that fix color and the like and the genes that shape courage or literary genius."34
As stated previously in this essay, Appiah contends that if we are to understand
what the term "race" means, then it is especially helpful for us to find something in the
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world to which it would most appropriately refer. Let us now turn, then, to Appiah' s
referential analysis of race.
Section 1.4: Race and the Referential Method
Similar to Descartes and Humphrey, Jefferson and Arnold made the mistake of
improperly using a term to denote phenomena that was quite different in nature than they
had assumed. Under Appiah' s causal theory, we too, must presume that there was some
referent to which Jefferson and Arnold were attempting to signify by the term "race".
This referent must, at the very least, contain some of the characteristics that were
attributed to race. Therefore, it is Appiah' s task to discover the best candidates for the
referent of "race."35 He holds that there are two candidates worthy of consideration as
possible referents for race that could potentially correspond to the beliefs of Jefferson and
Arnold.
The first possible referent would be "populations." Appiah defines a population as
a "community of potentially interbreeding individuals at a given locality."36 However,
the concept of a population is usually taken to mean that it can vary in its size and
geographic location such that one population may be included within or overlap with
another population. Moreover, this conception of race may not be appropriate when
discussing humans, as it would be to some other species within the field of population
genetics. Appiah states,
"What Darwin was talking about evolution, speciation, adaptation can best be
understood in terms of talk of populations. And the fact is that in many plants and
animals there are, in fact, local populations that are reproductively isolated from
35
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one another, different in clustered and biologically interesting ways, and still
capable of interbreeding if brought together; and biologists both before and after
Darwin could have called these "races." It's just that this doesn't happen in
human beings. In this sense, there are biological races in some creatures, but not
in us."37
Appiah further states that one possible way to make populations a suitable referent is by
broadening the scope of its meaning to include small isolated groups within a given
locale. This could allow for the possibility of human races ( Appiah offers the Amish as
such a group ).3 8 However, this conception ofpopulations does not include Jefferson or
Arnold's criteria} beliefs, nor does it reflect our current criteria} beliefs in regard to race.
In Westem society, race is primarily marked by phenotype. People with certain
often vaguely similar phenotypes are thought to be ofthe same race regardless of their
surrounding community, potential breeding pool, geographical location, or diversity of
ancestry. For instance, a person who was born and raised in Tennessee and a person
raised in Alaska thought to share certain physical characteristics attributed to a race are
considered part ofthe same race. So, consistent with Jefferson's view, skin pigment, hair
texture, and other facial characteristics are considered to be more reliable racial indicators
ofwhether one is "black" regardless of her place of birth.
Appiah's second possible candidate as a referent for race would be a group of
individuals that share certain phenotypical characteristics and are connected to particular
geographical regions. However, for Appiah these variations ofphenotypic characteristics
are likely to offer nothing helpful to biology. He argues that this particular candidate
37
38

Ibid., p. 73
Ibid

21

would be useless in attempting to determine one's race in the United States, because we
are far from being a genetically homogeneous country.

39

Persons considered ''white",

for example, have phenotypical traits and have ancestry traceable to a wide array of
geographical regions.

"White" in this case can include persons of mixed biological

heritage. A person with one grandmother from Sicily, the other from Ireland, and a
grandfather from England, and another from Cleveland would be considered white in this
society as long as their phenotypes are consistent with physical traits generally
considered as white traits. Being considered ''white" or "black" would have included
more morphological variation than persons like Jefferson would have imagined. We can
conclude that such a diverse conception of race would go far beyond the bounds of what
Arnold considered to be as races as even the Celts and Saxons could be divided up in a
myriad of races.
Examples similar to what I have provided are not borderline. Ancestral diversity
is a fact in American life. If we are to agree with Appiah that we have inherited our
current views of race, while acknowledging the fact of miscegenation in this country and
the broadening of our racial categories, then the validity of our entire racial paradigm
comes into question. Our current "races" may in some ways reflect the criteria! beliefs of
those who provided our criteria! residue. However, our current conception of race is
simply far more complex. Ifwe are to consider Appiah's approach to be valid, then we
must also consider his assertion that there are no races to be valid. Furthermore, "race" in
the common vernacular does not correspond to the same thing denoted by the term "race"
when used by Darwin and post-Darwinian scientists. Appiah states, "you can get various
possible candidates from the referential notion of meaning, but none of them will be
39
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much help explaining psychological and social life, and none of them corresponds to the
,,
social groups that we call "races" in America. 4o So, under the referential theory, races
do not exist.
One might question Appiah's dismissal of phenotypic markers on the basis of
their practical use in Western society. For instance, skin color might be useful in helping
doctors identify people that may be high risk for certain diseases, or in helping police
capture criminals, or giving us a general idea of one's ancestry. To answer such
concerns, I offer this reminder: Appiah is not arguing that race does not exist in our
social reality. To the contrary, as we expand our discussion of racialism and later discuss
Appiah's normative project, it becomes quite clear that race exists in our social reality.
Appiah, however, is arguing that human races, as we generally refer to them, do not exist
as objective facts. It is the mistaken idea that races exist as scientific fact that our current
beliefs about race are generally grounded. Race categorization as used in the examples
above may actually affirm our mistaken notions about race.
I shall now discuss in more detail the scope of racialism to allow us to better
understand how it fits in with Appiah's analytical and normative analysis. Furthermore,
we will be able to see the consequences of a validation of the term "race" whether it is for
practical, moral, or even ethical reasons.
Section 1.5: The Racialist Triad: Racialism, Extrinsic Racism, and Intrinsic Racism

In this section of the essay, I explore the consequences of the invention,
reification, and subsequent affirmation of the Western conception of race. As we have
seen, the racialism of persons such as Arnold and Jefferson does not follow the concept
of race. Rather, racialism was the key aspect in the creation of the race categorization.
40
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Even today racialism acts as a fuel used to power the idea of "race." To understand this
fact is to understand preliminary dangers of racialism and its manifestations.
So far we have examined in detail K. Anthony Appiah's linguistic analysis of
"race" appearing in Color Conscious. The descriptive aspects of racialism, however, are
presented at greater length in his article entitled "The Conservation of Race." They
illuminate his purpose and reasoning. I believe that while these aspects are not in his
primary work, Color Conscious, his discussion of what I shall refer to as his "racialist
triad" strengthens the foundations of both the analytical and normative parts of his race
theory. The racialist triad captures what is generally referred to as "racism." This triad
consists of three separate, but not necessarily distinct doctrines, 1) racialism, 2) extrinsic
racism, and 3) intrinsic racism.
As we have seen racialism need not require malicious intent. As Appiah points
out in Color Conscious, Jefferson's racialism was a means not only to make moral and
aesthetic assessments about persons and the products of their creation, but also to try to
separate people for the purpose of preventing societal discontent that would likely occur
as a result of racial oppression and injustice. And, while Jefferson's racialism was an
attempt to separate people to maintain social stability, Arnold's racialism was used as a
means to achieve universality, a coming together of peoples in a literary and artistic
sense. 4 1 According to Appiah, racialism, when taken alone, does not have to pose a
serious threat despite its racial essentialism. He states, "that positive moral qualities are
distributed across the races, each one can be respected, can have its "separate but equal"
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place."42 Here, Appiah is likely referring to what could be an overlap that may occur
between racialism and some multiculturalist doctrines. While such a relationship may
not be overtly dangerous, this does not mean that the possibility for potential danger does
not exist, as we will see when we later address Appiah's assessment of racial identity.
One of the more dangerous and challenging companions to the idea of race is
racism. The idea of racism is controversial for Appiah and not as simple as we generally
take it to be in modem society. This is because the foundational structure of racism is
racialism. Racialism is "a presupposition of other doctrines that may have been called
'racism,' and these other doctrines have been, in the last few centuries, the basis of a
great deal of moral error and the source of a great deal of suffering. "43
The doctrine of racialism is presupposed by two other racial doctrines provided by
Appiah. The first of these is what he calls extrinsic racism. He states, "Extrinsic racists
make moral distinctions between members of different races, because they believe that
the racial essence entails certain morally relevant qualities."44 Let us now consider some
examples of this form of racism.
A common racialist notion evident in American culture is that black people are
hypersexual. This notion is further fueled by black exploitation films and the lyrics and
images made popular by current hip hop and rap culture. So, let us imagine a white
person named Tommy. Tommy believes the aforementioned characteristic to be factually
true of blacks and morally repugnant. He, therefore, hates and desires to harm black
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persons. Under Appiah's view, Tommy is an extrinsic racist he focuses on a particular
negative moral quality that he believes to have a natural and fixed presence in blacks.
Now, consider a slightly different scenario. Imagine that there is a positive moral
quality entailed by being a member of the black race. For instance, imagine that black
people were thought to have more courage than whites and that this fact was fixed in
nature. Tommy, being white, considers himself deficient in this moral quality. However,
he still believes that courage is a moral ideal. As a result, he chooses to both associate
with and show reverence to black people on the sole basis that the black racial essence
includes courage. It is the moral quality that is encapsulated by this essence that is of
importance, rather than race itself. Therefore, Tommy is once again an extrinsic racist.
Focusing on moral qualities is not the only way to determine whether a person is
extrinsic racist. Appiah holds that in the face of evidence that contradicts the existence of
an innate moral quality, a sincere extrinsic racist must cease holding the false belief. So
if it were demonstrated that not all blacks are either hypersexual or courageous, then
Tommy would accept this evidence as fact. These two moral qualities would no longer
be relevant factors for his moral judgments in regard to race. If he fails to reject these
factors based on the evidence, then the problem may be cognitive. He could simply lack
the intellectual ability to part himself with such beliefs or understand the evidence. A
second possibility is that Tommy may be guilty of what Appiah calls intrinsic racism. "45
Intrinsic racism is the final doctrine of Appiah's racialist triad. He states,
"intrinsic racists, in my definition, are people who differentiate morally between
members of different races, because they believe that each race has a different moral
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status, q uite ind ep end ent of the m oral c harac teristic s entail ed by its rac ial essenc e.',46 An
exampl e of an intrinsic rac ist is the neo- naz i who fe el s that bl ack and J ewish p eopl e are
worthy of d eath fo r the sol e reason that they are bl ack or that they are J ewish. Som e
intrinsic rac ists m ay ac tuall y attack c ertain m oral q ual ities supp osedl y entail ed by
another' s rac e. For instanc e, neo- naz is oft en refe r to what they bel iev e are negativ e
m oral c harac teristic s of bl ack s or J ews. T he foc us on these m oral q ual ities m ay app ear to
be, by App iah' s d efinition, extrinsic rac ism. Howev er, an attack on m oral c harac teristic s
c an ac t as a front fo r what is ac tu all y a d eep- seated resentm ent based on the m oral status
of a group, rather than p artic ul ar q ual ities. A nother p ossibil ity is that m oral q ual ities are
onl y m eant to serv e as refl ec tions of what is thought to be the d efic ient m oral status of a
group . B oth of these exampl es are d em onstrations of insinc ere extrinsic rac ism.
Ul tim atel y, howev er, they expl ic itl y show intrinsic rac ism.
E xampl es of intrinsic rac ism need not be as ov ert as these ex ampl es. App iah
asserts thatBl ack N ational ism is a subtl er exampl e of intrinsic rac ism. He states that
"W here rac ism is impl ic ated in the basis fo r national sol id arity, it is intrinsic not
extrinsic . "47 ForApp iah, it is a m istak e to think that the foc us of Bl ack N ational ism is
on m oral c harac teristic s simpl y entail ed by one' s rac e. R ather, rac e al one ac ts as the
d eterm ining fac tor in p rom oting fr atern ity am ong st bl ack s, reg ardl ess of the m oral
c harac ter of p artic ul ar gr oup m em bers. 48 T hep robl em here is that by using rac e to
p rom ote fr atern ity, it is inherent that this fr atern ity d isc rim inates ag ainst others on the
basis of rac e.
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In sum, extrinsic racism is a problem where the moral judgment is attributable to
ignorance of fact and/or cognitive incapacity, while intrinsic racism turns its back in the
face of evidence. Furthermore, intrinsic racism is what Appiah calls a "moral error." He
states, "even if racialism were correct, the bare fact that someone was of another race
would be no reason to treat him or her worse--or better--than some one of my race."49
The real danger of these two racialist doctrines is that they exist as ideologies-they
inform our personal, social and political judgments. This is evidenced in the fact that
these racisms commit us to particular racial groups while deeming other groups morally
inferior or even superior. 50 It should be clear why intrinsic racism provides the greater
threat. It is as much of a dogma as it is an ideo logy insofar as it is decidedly stubborn
and irrational in its commitment to race as an objective truth and as a legitimate basis of
judging moral status.
While some may find Appiah's description of Black Nationalism as intrinsic
racism controversial, this idea of what he considers to be a racist movement (created as a
reaction to social and systematic intrinsic racism) will play a role in our upcoming
discussion of identities. Just as our views of race are the residue of views held by white
elites, so are the views of some blacks the residue of reactions to the racial oppression in
this culture. This is a point to which I will soon return.
Where do Jefferson and Arnold fit into these racialist doctrines? Appiah does
not state explicitly that any specific beliefs held by Arnold and Jefferson were racist.
However, in reference to his analysis in Color Conscious, he states " . . .it is obvious, I
think, from the history I have explored, that racism has been central to the development
49
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ofrace theory. In that sense, racism has been part of the story all along." 51 For Appiah,
the story of racism is incomplete without referring to racialist foundations that both fuel
and undergird it. Therefore, I would argue, that Jefferson and Arnold should both be
considered extrinsic racists. Both men regarded characteristics thought to be attributable
to race as morally relevant factors. Since both men at least thought they were working
from the scientific tools of the time, there is no reason to assume that they held their
beliefs of be non-falsifiable. Jefferson, for instance, expressed caution in his judgments
and even held for the possibility that what he regarded as racial characteristics were
socially contingent. He even went so far as to say that he hoped that his past comments
regarding the moral capacities ofblacks had been in error. 52
While these thinkers might have expressed extrinsic racism, Appiah feels that
most of our current views about race are intrinsic racism. It is the fear of "moral
criticism" that prevents us from overtly expressing our intrinsic racism. 53 This is
demonstrated in the fact that we continue to hold race as central to our conception of self
and others. This is despite the fact that there is scientific agreement that race does not
exist. 54 Other examples include both our continuing usage of the "one-drop rule" for
determining race and by the fact that so-called racial miscegenation is still largely
considered a moral taboo. The question becomes, how can we deal with dogmatic racism
that remains pervasive in our cultural psyches? Appiah insists that the way to combat
intrinsic racism is by "challenging the racialism it presupposes."55 This assertion gives
insight into the purpose and means used for his racial investigation appearing in Color
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Conscious. It explains his focus on racialism, as opposed to racism, and for using
methodology that would expose racialism at the foundational level.
One thing that follows from Appiah's investigation is that racialism is responsible
for the development of the race concept and racism. Simply put, without racialism, our
past and current beliefs about race would have no foundation. Racism presupposes
racialism and the belief that races exist. It is therefore understandable why Appiah
asserts "The disappearance of a widespread belief in the biological category of the Negro
would leave nothing for racists to have an attitude towards." 56 If we rid ourselves of
racialism, then we subsequently rid ourselves of the products of racialism-namely, race
and racism.
This is not the only end that Appiah seeks to accomplish. Up to this point, I have
demonstrated Appiah's foundational analysis of race. I have also examined the nature
and consequences of the racialism that both gave rise to and constitute the meaning of
"race". We shall now tum our focus from Appiah 's analytical project to his normative
project in which he offers solutions for moving forward morally and politically in the
wake of the deconstruction of race.
Section 1.6: Race, Culture and the Normative Proj ect
If we agree with Appiah that race is a spurious concept founded on racialist
assumptions, then with what should we replace this concept to explain the social
distinctions brought about by race? The multiculturalist's answer might be that we
should make an appeal to culture rather than race because it more accurately explains
who we are individually. For the multiculturalist, "black", for instance, should become
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(and in many cases has already become) replaced with African-American, because it is
thought that blacks share a common culture.
Appiah, however, rejects this appeal to culture. If we define culture as persons
sharing a common history, mores, folkways, language, dialect and traditions, etc., then it
is not a given that the people designated as members of races actually share any of these
aspects of culture. For instance, it is not likely that a white person from rural Mississippi
shares the same types of cultural practices as an Italian American from New York City.
Similarly, someone considered black from rural Tennessee is not likely to share the same
types of cultural practices and relics as a black person from Orange County, California or
inner city New York. The claim that these persons share a common culture by virtue of
their phenotype, Appiah asserts, is not something that we should simply assume is the
case. Rather, such a claim "needs to be argued."57
In this society, there is an overlap between perceived race and culture. Racial
indicators, such as phenotype, are the primary tools used to assign particular cultures to
individuals. So, if we take one of the above examples, something as arbitrary as race is
generally all that is needed to place the person from Tennessee and the person from
California in the same culturally homogenous bowl. 58 However, Appiah explains that,
"African-Americans do not have a single culture, in the sense of shared
language, values, practices, and meanings. But many people who think of races
as groups defined by shared cultures, conceive that sharing in a different way.
They understand black people as sharing black culture by definition: jazz or hip
hop belongs to an African American, whether she likes it or knows anything about
57
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it, because it is culturally marked as black. Jazz belongs to a black person who
knows nothing about it more fully or naturally than it does to a white jazzman. "59
Appiah calls this phenomenon "cultural geneticism." 60 It means that one's racial
identity gives one a birthright to belong to particular cultures. Under such a view, we see
the doctrine of racialism reveal itself. Cultural geneticism is inherently racialist because
it affirms the idea of some shared essence that connects one to others by virtue of their
race. Appiah, therefore, rejects our societal conception of racialized culture because it is
bound to racialism. This is not to say that Appiah does not believe that an African
American culture cannot exist. To the contrary, he asserts that such cultures do, indeed,
exist-only many of them. 61
As we can see, it would be quite difficult to provide an account of culture to
explain our social distinctions without making reference to one's designated race.
Therefore, Appiah prefers "racial identities" to cultural identities. Racial identities are,
for Appiah, better equipped to handle moral and political questions without, necessarily,
having to appeal to racial essences. Thus, let us now move the focus of our discussion to
the concept of racial identities.
Section 1.7: Racial Identity, Ascription, and Identification

Identities are the labels that we assign to ourselves or that society assigns to us.
The process in which these identities are assigned, Appiah calls "ascription. " 62
Ascriptive identities are aspects of our lives from which we can derive value and that can
act as catalysts of great suffering. The complex assortment of available identities,
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whether it be identities such as gay, lesbian, creative, or professor, are often taken to
represent aspects of who and what we are.
An important supplement to the concept of identity is what Appiah calls
identification. He describes this "as the process through which an individual
intentionally shapes her projects--including her plans for her own life and her conception
of the good-by reference to available labels, available identities." 63

A person guides

the course of action in her life by her possible identities. For instance, as a part of this
process of identity building, a person ascribed the label scientist may choose her
associations, choose schools, read certain journals, eat certain foods, or even live in
certain places based on this identity. Such a process seems, at first glance, rather
uncontroversial. Identification could easily be regarded as an exercise of one's
autonomy, prima facie. In the given example, the scientist is devising a blueprint that
will allow her to gain value from her life based largely in part to that identity she may
have chosen-because she is or desires to become who or to what the label "scientist" is
theoretically committed.
The problem is, as Appiah asserts, the process of identification is not always
vo luntary and may actually undermine the idea of autonomy. 64 In regard to racial
identities, few ofus have chosen to be "black" or "white." They are labels ascribed to us
in which we have very little say, with the exception being that some ofus are able to
"pass" as more than one race. 65 Ascriptive identities, then, can potentially be harmful in
the sense that it lessens our scope of choice. In the case where identities are given to us
involuntarily, the only choice may be in how important of a place we allow ascribed
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identities to maintain in our lives--especially when carving out life plans and our
conception of the good. 66
Appiah holds that there are two different dimensions of individual identity. First,
there is the personal dimension, which would consist of identities such as bravery,
creativity, and intelligence. The second dimension of identity is the collective dimension.
According to Appiah, this area brings together the morally and socially relevant aspects
of our lives by bridging together our collective identities. These collective identities
include identities such as gay, Asian, woman, and Catholic-specifically, the social
categories that exists in society. 67 While our personal identities may have some social
consequences, the collective dimension is where we find the socially and morally
significant difficulties of ascriptive identities.
Section 1.8: Racial Identity and the Problem of Authenticity
Let us now briefly discuss a problem that arises in regard to how collective
identities operate within the moral, social, and political spheres. Appiah states that in
liberal society "we see public morality as engaging each ofus as individuals with our
individual ' identities. "' He further states, " . . . we have the notion, which comes . . . from
the ethics of authenticity, that, other things being equal, people have the right to be
acknowledged publicly as what they already really are.',6 8 In terms of collective
identities, we often regard these identities as central to who we are. Therefore, we seek
recognition of these collective identities because recognition of these identities by society
and by the political structure is a demonstration of respect for our authentic selves. By
denying persons the right to recognize these identities is asking them to deny our
66
67
68

Ibid .
Ibid., 93
Ibid ., 92

34

authentic selves. Such issues are bound to what Charles Taylor has termed the "politics
of recognition." Appiah defines the politics of recognition as "a politics that asks us to
,
acknowledge socially and politically the authentic identities of others.' 69
The politics of recognition requires that personal and collective identities are
centralized by its adherence to ideal of"authenticity," a term also offered by Charles
Taylor. Authenticity is the idea that, as Taylor states, ''There is a certain way of being
that is my way. I am called upon to live my life this way. . . If l am not [true to mysel�, I
miss the point of my life." 70 The ideal of authenticity, in relation to racial identity,
then, would present, for example, black identity as constituting the authentic self. The
politics of recognition would require that this authentic black self be recognized socially
and politically. To recognize racial identities, in this regard, is to respect those persons
as members of races. Appiah states that because "I seek to express myself that I seek
recognition of an African-American identity. "7 1
The ideal of authenticity is plagued with several problems for Appiah. The first
problem relates it to the politics of recognition. The politics of recognition with the ideal
of authenticity requires more than merely having a racial identity. Appiah argues that it
requires that we "demonstrate a respect" for our identities, by attempting to secure
respect from those who hold the very same identities that we seek to resist.72
This first problem of authenticity exposes a second problem with the ideal.
Authenticity assumes that as a racial group member that my authentic self is constituted
independently of other identities. Furthermore, it assumes that the institutions and
Ibid.
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traditions of my social environment do not shape my authentic self. This negation of a
holistic view of social contingency demonstrates a failure of the ideal insofar as it fails to
recognize that we are "dialogically constituted" by the society around us. 73 This fact is
demonstrated by the need to ascribe racial identities and demonstrate reverence for that
identity under a politics of recognition. Appiah states that African American identity "is
centrally shaped by American society and institutions: it cannot be seen as solely
constructed within African American communities." 74 It is for this reason that Appiah,
as mentioned earlier, rejects the idea of a singular African American culture and asserts
that there are instead African American cultures shaped by and in constant dialogue with
the society from which they originate.
Appiah presents a final problem that can arise from the ideal of authenticity. He
argues that this ideal can contain an inherent appeal to essences. It can assert that
beneath one's skin is a real self there to be expressed, "an authentic nugget of selfhood."
Such a view shares the same pitfall of the previous problem of authenticity and therefore
shares its objections. The appeal to an essential essence fails to recognize that the self is
a product of its surroundings. Furthermore, we shape this self with materials made
available to us by society-we are dependent on such materials. While an account of
authenticity that does not contain essentialism may be possible, according to Appiah, we
must exercise caution. The differentiating factor amongst collective identities is the f3:ct
some of these identities, like racial identity, are ascribed based on fictional criteria. He
states of these fiction based identities that "in all of them the story is complex, involves
'making up people, ' and cannot be explained by an appeal to an essence."
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Thus far, I have provided some of the drawbacks of "racial identity" to account
for the significance of race in this society: 1 ) involuntary identification and 2) the
problem of authenticity. There is a third difficulty that arises in regard to racial identity
in regard to it being a collective identity. A defining feature of collective identities is the
presence of scripts. Appiah defines scripts as "narratives that people can use in shaping
their life plans and in telling their life stories."75 Racial identity will certainly have life
plans, choices, career or otherwise, based on one' s identity as a member of that race for
purpose of identification. The available scripts for racial identity, like the problem of
involuntary identification, will be contingent on how much one allows race to be a factor
in one's life. 76 Ascriptive racial identities can bring about negative consequences.
Appiah states that "we expect people of a certain race to behave a certain way not simply
because they are conforming to the script for that identity, performing that role, but
because they have certain antecedent properties that are consequences of the label's
properly applying to them."77
If we now revisit the concept of racialism, we can see the potential problems that
it may present for racial identities. Many blacks, for instance, have inherited the
racialism in the form of extrinsic racism of Arnold and Jefferson and subsequently the
sometimes-reactionary intrinsic racism exhibited in Black Nationalism. There can be
social and psychological affects to the identification process, both of which can impede
our abilities to conceive and execute our life plans, our :freedom, and our autonomy. For
instance, scripts provided by an involuntary Black Nationalist model may limit the scripts
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available to a person. For example, one model may provide scripts that assert that a
person should only marry a person of the opposite sex who shares a black racial identity,
be a particular profession or only listen to music that is racially marked "black"
While Appiah discusses some of the potentially negative consequences that could
occur as a result of identification and limited number of life scripts, he fails to talk about
the complexities surrounding conflicting multi-sided identities. Imagine a person, for
example, who would have ( 1 ) black racial identity that entails a certain set of ascribed
characteristics and capacities, while having (2) a gay identity that afTrrms the converse of
those qualities, and (3) a personal identity of "political." For instance, she may desire to
be a politician. However, a black racial identity may provide only life scripts for political
life that would conflict with the available scripts for political life provided by her gay
identity.
This war of conflicting collective identities could potentially strain both her
autonomy and freedom. By asserting that our choices will be contingent upon how
central we make our collective identities, Appiah seems to be placing the burden on the
person having to make this choice. The process of identification for these identities will
put her life plans in conflict or perhaps even cause her to repress some of the aspects that
she may regard as central to her identity. Therefore, it may not be a matter of how
committed she is to these ascriptive identities but rather how much society forces her to
commit to these identities.
While he does not explore in great detail the surplus of potential complex
intermingling of collective identities, Appiah appears to hope that racial identities will
ultimately be detached from any straining process of identification.

Therefore, if we

take on racial identities for the purpose of countering the negative consequences that have
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occurred as result of racial demarcation, we must be careful that the racial identities do
not require too much of us.
Appiah tentatively states that racial identity without essentialism may be a
"historically" and "strategically" necessary transition in accounting for the social
distinctions brought about by race and in ending racism. Unfortunately, he offers no
examples to demonstrate such a conception of identity. It would not, however, be
difficult construct such a conception. We can conceive of a racial identity that
recognizes that race itself was based on false assumptions and therefore does not
commit itself to foundations of the label itself For instance, there is a fundamental
difference between saying "We, who are racially marked "black" and who are
oppressed as a consequence of that demarcation . . .. " and "We, who are black, want to
be recognized and respected as black people." The former example is decidedly both
political and non-essentialist, while the latter example may commit us to some degree
of racial essentialism."
Appiah recognizes that even with the use of racial identities that do not appeal
to essences when attempting to secure social and political respect that there will be
"expectations to be met" and that "demands will be made." He goes on to say that,
''one who takes autonomy seriously will want to ask whether we have not replaced one
kind of tyranny with another. If l had to choose between Uncle Tom and Black Power,
I would, of course, choose the latter. But I would like to not have to choose. I would
like other options."78
The end result, however, could not only give rise to the potential problems I
have just discussed, but others as well. Appiah states racial identities, like all
78
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collective identities, can "go imperial," taking primacy over other identities that make
up who we are. 79 For Appiah then, we need to be careful how much we value the
fictitious concept of race. Its racialist foundations allow it power over our
associations, over our desires, our actions--our options. As Appiah states, "It is
crucial to remember that we are not simply black or white or yellow or brown or gay
or straight or bisexual, Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Buddhists, or Confucian but that we
are also brothers and sisters; parents and children; liberals, conservatives, and
,,80
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Chapter 2: Criticisms of Appiah
Section 2.1: Introduction
Considering our previous discussion on both racialism and its consequences, it is
easy to understand why Appiah expresses that we may ultimately need to move beyond
racial identities. However, the tenets of Appiah's racial theory do not go without some
formidable criticism. In this Chapter, I shall briefly explore some of the criticisms
against Appiah employed by Michelle Moody-Adams and Paul C. Taylor as well as my
own criticism of Appiah 's normative project.

Section 2.2: Paul C. Taylor on Appiah's Analytical and Normative Proj ect
In the article "Appiah' s Uncompleted Argument: W. E. B. Dubois and the
Reality of Race," Paul C. Taylor offers several strong challenges to Appiah's theory. He
believes that Appiah is a "racial eliminativist." This means that Appiah "believes that
races do not exist, that acting as if they do is metaphysically indefensible and morally
dangerous." So "eliminating 'race' from our metaphysical vocabularies is an important
step toward the right or a better-that is to say, a rational and just-worldview." 8 1
Taylor rejects Appiah's eliminativism and presents criticisms of both analytical and
normative aspects of Appiah's theory. Let us now briefly examine these objections.
The first challenge Taylor offers is in regard to Appiah's usage of Thomas
Jefferson and Matthew Arnold. Recall that Appiah uses these two subjects to represent
the historical origins from which we inherited our current views on race. He holds that
both of these intellectuals would have been considered experts on race in their day
people to whom important questions about race could be deferred. Therein lies the
81
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problem for Taylor. Taylor argues that by focusing solely on these two subjects for his
historical inquiry that Appiah " . . . renders the history of race-talk in a problematic and
partisan manner, counting as producers and disseminators of racialist meaning only those
figures who subscribe to the tenets of classical racialism." He further states, "As a
consequence, his [Appiah's] explication of "race" is somewhat less than reliable ."82
Taylor agrees with Appiah that the race-talk of Jefferson and Arnold was steeped
in racialist language. However, Taylor contends that there were several 19th century
thinkers who appealed to "race" without utilizing Jefferson and Arnold's racial
essentialism. To demonstrate this fact, Taylor offers several examples in which
intellectuals spoke about race in non-racialist terms and who did not contend that it was
necessary to abolish race-talk altogether. Most of these examples come as a response to
the "eliminativist strategy" of ''the early black American convention movement." In
response to this strategy, one of the participants, William Watkins, acknowledged in 1 83 5
that the foundation of race was faulty but regarded this fact in itself as arbitrary. He
contended that race had become so "fixed in meaning" within our language that it should
not be omitted from racial discourse. 83
Another example also comes from a response to the strategy of the convention
movement. An anonymous writer claimed that race-based terminology has political
necessity. The idea here is that race has practical usage for political action when it comes
to organizing as an oppressed people or as "colored people."84 In both of these examples
the appeal to race is quite different than the racialist ideology that appears in the works of
Jefferson and Arnold. In fact, as we can see, such ways of talking about race were meant
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to evoke action against what were perhaps the consequences that occurred as a result to
racialist thinking. Taylor's point, however, is that Appiah does not present a full picture
to support his eliminativism and therefore it is not necessary to eliminate all appeals to
race. A more holistic collection of past criteria! beliefs may mean that we only need to
eliminate racialist appeals to race.
This, I believe, is an important challenge to Appiah's theory. It is indeed
questionable whether Appiah omits thinkers that may contradict his philosophical
assertions in regard to the history ofracialism. Perhaps, if he had taken such accounts
into consideration his analysis would have allowed him to better illuminate the nature of
our current ideas about race. The conclusion could indeed be that race at that particular
point in time was confused and often conflicting and that this fact mirrors the race-talk of
today. Appiah may have opted to take his analysis further back into history to a time
when the ideas behind race talk were more likely to cohere. Then he could present a
clearer picture of the evolution of race talk.
Despite the problems that have been presented, it is still not clear that Appiah's
utilization of Jefferson and Arnold should be discounted. There are several different ways
we can approach Taylor's concern. The first of these is quite simple. The picture that
Taylor paints of Appiah's approach is at its best uncharitable and at its worst misleading.
Appiah examines Jefferson's work ranging from the 1780's, where Jefferson exhibited
the majority of his racialism, to 1808, in which he began to waiver in his more rigid
essentialism. Jefferson entertained the idea that his prior assessment about the nature of
blacks could have been in error. He acknowledged that the social conditions of blacks,
both in his time and previously, may have been limiting factors preventing their talents
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from flourishing. 85 Taylor provides examples showing competing forms of "race-talk"
occurring between 1 830 and the l 840's, a time leading up to significant social change for
both free and enslaved blacks. 86 As I alluded to earlier, an argument can be made (one
with which Appiah would no doubt agree) that the enduring consequences of racialism of
that time period served as a catalyst of racial discourse that occurred at the black
conventions in which Taylor derives most of his counter-examples. The admitted "anti
racialist" and "eliminativist" strategy of these conventions supports Appiah's analysis as
much as the dissenting voices of this strategy that Taylor has provided support his
counter-arguments.
For Appiah, Matthew Arnold represents racialist thinking in the late I 8th and early
1 9th centuries, whereas the main writers who could be said to have spoken about race in
non-essentialist or reactionary terms, such as W.E.B. Dubois began to surface after this
time period. 87 There is no doubt that both Taylor and Appiah agree that racialist thinking
exists today and that there are persons who do not speak of race in racialist terms (Taylor
himself being an example of the latter). The coexistence of these two ways of talking
about race does not detract from one of Appiah' s key underlying points: that racialist
thinking exists today and was inherited as such from previous generations. We can argue
that non-essentialist race-talk was inherited as well, but as I have mentioned such talk can
be interpreted as an attempt to battle racialism and its consequences whether they are
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racism or even as Appiah contends the idea ofrace itself. Ifthe argument can be made
that whatever racial dialogue took place in the past either sprang from racialism or was a
response to racialism, Appiah may simply have regarded the inclusion ofexamples such
as Taylor's as superfluous for his analysis.
While Taylor supports a socio-historical approach to race and Appiah favors an
eliminativist approach, there is no reason to think that the ultimate focus oftheir
arguments is similar. After all, for Appiah, ifracialism did not exist, then neither would
its consequences-race and racism, whether essentialist in nature, socio-cultural, or a
combination. As we have seen, Appiah acknowledges an understanding that there may
be work that needs to be completed on the social and political level. He simply asserts
that it may not be possible to talk about race on these levels without first addressing the
racialism that not only gave birth to the idea ofrace, but also kept it alive over
generations.
Another way of approaching Taylor's challenge to Appiah's methodology is to
revisit the technical details ofAppiah's theory. As I have stated Jefferson and Arnold
were selected because they were considered experts on the subject ofrace-scientific
experts. It is not likely that questions on the scientific nature ofrace were deferred to
William Watkins or even W.E.B. Dubois. Certainly, the views of these thinkers have
influenced the current generation of social race theorists, but it is not likely that such
views were effectively disseminated into common western scientific thought. These
thinkers may have been considered experts on racism. However, in a predominantly
white society they were not likely considered experts on race.
Once again, we are able to see the types of legitimate criticisms spawned by
Appiah's lack of an inheritance theory. An adequate inheritance theory would explain
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why elements of classical racialism have survived over generations while also explaining
why racialism has been given primacy over socio-historical appeals to race in the
common culture-why the view that blacks have greater natural athletic prowess has
survived over the idea that athletic accomplishments may be attributable to socio-cultural
factors, and so on. If the inheritors of the historical ideas were confined to certain areas
within the academic realm, then Taylor's argument would carry greater weight.
However, Appiah's intention was to show that we have inherited classical racialism as a
society writ large and that the thought that fueled this racialism was misinformed.
Taylor offers a second objection to Appiah's racial theory. This is in regard to
Appiah's assertion that we may need to move beyond racial identities. Taylor agrees that
racial identities are potentially dangerous bec ause they have the tendency to, as Appiah
states, "go imperial" over other important aspects of our lives. 88 However, he states,
"The recognition that something carries with it a danger does not immediately
entail that the something should be put aside, think of fire, for example, or of
automobiles in the hands of teenagers. Specifically, if an object or device presents
some dangers but is in other respects useful, then recognizing the danger and
acting responsibly toward the object in question should require only that we
proceed with care. "89
Taylor's objection here seems plausible, primafacie. Race and racial identities may
present danger, but can also give, for instance, a sense of commonness between persons
or even be used as a means to address the concerns brought about by racism in the
political world. Taylor's analogy is flawed, however, because he mischaracterizes
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Appiah's view. It is true that fire and automobiles have beneficial and practical value. It
may also be true that their positive value outweighs the potential dangers that come from
their utilization. The problem is that fire and automobiles are real and objective things.
Therefore, this analogy is inappropriate when speaking of race, because race, the
presupposition of racial identity, is an unreal physical phenomenon. It is not simply a
different type of thing, but it is not a thing at all. The problem for Appiah is that it is an
unreal phenomenon that has exhibited serious negative consequences not only by causing
overt acts of racism, but also in acting as a primary variable that shapes a large aspect of
our lives. Even the slightest sense of the most practical utility that racial existence might
hold carries the potential for even further negative consequences at the expense of
autonomy and the well-being of affected persons. It is dangerous because 1 ) we tend to
think that it is real and 2) since we think it is real we tend to think that it should determine
how, why, and with whom we should live our lives.
There is a more appropriate albeit controversial analogy that could shed some
light on Appiah's viewpoint. Say, for instance, that there is a person who thinks that she
is a product of the Christian god. Now, because she holds this belief she follows a
narrative of her life that she be kind and giving to her fellow Christians-that she regard
these folks as part of her moral community. She derives meaning from both her belief
and solidarity with like-minded persons in a world of sinners. Her belief in God also
requires that she not associate with people who are not part of her moral community,
namely non-Christians, homosexuals, non-whites, and philosophers. Now say that there
is evidence that God is a fictional creation. She chooses to accept this evidence, but is
not willing to give up being a Christian. The question becomes whether the practical
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benefits of remaining a Christian outweigh the negative consequences that being a
Christian could bring about.
In the above analogy, Taylor would argue that remaining a Christian could have
some practical benefit and therefore she should remain a Christian. Appiah, however,
would argue that despite the fact that she derives meaning from being a Christian, the
foundation for that meaning, Jehovah, is false. Therefore, she needs to be careful about
how central she makes Christianity in relation to her other identities, her social
interactions, and her political commitments. After alL she would be holding on to an
ideology that is inherently oppositional insofar as it commits her to one group while
regarding other groups as morally deficient.
Appiah's view is that racialism (the falsehood) has been and still is a shaping
force in our lives. It has exacted a harsh toll on individuals and society despite its
falseness. In its most obvious forms it has been a catalyst for discrimination,
enslavement, and murder. Less conspicuously, however, through the belief in the
existence of races, racialism informs our personal and social life as well as our ability to
form a conception of the good. So, rather than trying to accentuate the positive
consequences or combat the negative consequences of racial identity (at the potential
expense of the agent), our ultimate goal should be the complete dismantling of the racial
paradigm.
A final objection by Taylor also deals with Appiah's assertion that we may need
move beyond race and racial identities. Taylor states, "Explicitly and consciously
racist-and, hence, racialist-actions have, during the history of this country brought into
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being many exclusionary practices and unjust arrangements."90 However, Taylor asserts
that Appiah's approach eliminates the ability to appeal to race; thereby making
ineffective what could be the most useful tool available to combat these inequalities. 9 1
This objection specifically targets institutionalized and systematic manifestations of
racialism. Taylor fears that "patterns of exclusion and systems that were once explicitly
racist may presently be maintained by commitments to race-neutral colorblindness. "92
I contend, however, that the above conclusion does not follow from Appiah's
theory. As I shall later discuss, Appiah's philosophical partnership with political
philosopher Amy Gutmann, co-author of the book Color Conscious, is a demonstration
that an effective appeal to what has been perceived as race can still be implemented
without having to maintain race as a central part of our identities. For now, however, I
simply assert that Appiah sees the theoretical abolition of racial identities as something
that is to occur after social change. Indeed, as I have mentioned, Appiah acknowledges
that the use of racial identities when addressing racial injustice may be a necessary step to
racial justice. This would mean at both the social level and the political level-where
collective identities have in the past been effective for attempting to correct past racial
injustice.
We must remember that Appiah argues that at the end of the day, transitional
racial identities will eventually be replaced by truly voluntary non-racial identities.
However, Appiah's view does not exclude the recognition of a race-based polis. The
question becomes "Is it even possible to address race-informed systematic inequalities
without first examining the racialist foundation that gave support to these injustices?" It
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could be argued that as the political system begins to rid itself of racial injustice, that
racial injustice at the social level is likely to follow suit. The problem with this
viewpoint is that it seeks the treat the symptoms rather than the cancer itself. Such a view
fails to acknowledge that the underlying issue for systematic racialism has been a societal
commitment to an idea of whiteness, blackness, and race-to racialism. Significant
social change is unlikely to occur if the root of the problem is not addressed at both the
social and the political level. History has demonstrated this. Blacks are no longer slaves.
Discrimination is illegal. Blacks are considered full citizens. Yet society remains largely
segregated, income disparities exist, racism is still a fact of American life, interracial
relationships are still largely considered taboo, and race plays a determining factor in how
our lives are shaped. To put it simply, even as our political structure has become more
colorblind, society simply has not.
While Appiah does not focus his racial theory directly toward the political
structure, it is clear that he believes that acknowledging and distancing ourselves from
racial foundations will have positive ramifications in the political structure. Such a view
does not require that we do or do not take up racial identities. It does require, however,
that we at least acknowledge both that races do not exist and that racialism is a part of
American consciousness. This view asks that we relinquish our commitment to racialism
rather than affirm it by attempting to maintain its consequences.
Section 2.3: Michelle Moody-Adams on Appiah's Normative Project
Let us now turn to further criticism put forth by Michelle Moody-Adams, who,
like Taylor, objects to Appiah's controversial views towards racial identity. Michelle
Moody-Adams endorses the analytical approach of Appiah's theory. However, in the
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article "A Commentary on Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race," she takes
aim at Appiah's suggestion that we move beyond the use of racial identities. 93
Moody-Adams holds that Appiah's reluctance to fully endorse a conception of
black ofracial identity is unnecessary. Recall that Appiah believes that one of the
negative consequences of even non-essentialist racial identities is that they have the
tendency to evoke oppositional attitudes towards other racial identities. 94 Moody-Adams,
however, believes that such a conclusion is premature. She states, "When detached from
belief in inherited racial essences, the act of affirming a racial identity might simply be a
way of claiming solidarity with a group of people defined by a commonality of
experiences and shared histories ofresilience in the face of hardship."95 She holds that an
affirmation of such racial identity is healthy if it is self-sufficient, meaning that the
affirmation provides a basis for intra-racial solidarity and sustainability. 96 Moody
Adams points out that the types of black identity that Appiah finds problematic are the
ones in which the purpose is to gain recognition and respect from other racial identities.
Moody-Adams agrees with Appiah that these identities are oppositional. She further
states that such identities are not self-sufficient and are "incompatible with autonomy"
because they seek this recognition from persons outside of their racial group. 97
On the other hand self-sufficient black identities, according to Moody-Adams, can
be useful both in negating the negative effects that blacks have had to endure as a
consequence of racism and as a means to free persons from potentially dangerous
oppositional racial identities that may require that blacks reject mainstream (or seemingly
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non-black) norms. Blacks, for instance, that reject oppositional identities will be better
equipped to recognize the social and historical contingencies of their experiences and
conception of self. This will allow them to benefit others by helping alleviate the
negative consequences caused by racialism. She explains that "Appreciating these
histories and experiences would allow them to seek ways to develop the social bases of
healthy self respect, especially for those young black Americans whose vision is distorted
by the oppositional conception. "98 Blacks that take up non-oppositional identities could
assist in creating new ways to attempt to subdue the negative social influences that often
trap blacks in harsh circumstances. They can, perhaps, help others see the contingency of
their own situations and sense of self. Furthermore, such persons could try to provide
culturally visible alternatives to their situations. Then, young blacks that have
oppositional black identity could better see the limitations of that identity. They would
see that their oppositional identity is a consequence of racialism and so they would stop
reacting to their negative circumstances in ways that maintain the racialist structure.
Moody-Adams contends that a non-oppositional conception of black identity could be
successful in helping to stunt the American cultural identification process that instills in
black youth the values that have facilitated their failure by codifying certain counter
productive behaviors. 99
While I am sympathetic to Moody-Adams 's view, I believe that it is problematic.
First, Moody-Adams is arguing that her conception of black identity would not violate
one's autonomy because it is an identity that is affirmed by the agent rather persons who
do not hold that identity. The problem with this view is that it violates autonomy on two
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levels. First, it exchanges one heteronomy for another. It rejects interracial heteronomy,
where the black identity is governed by the need for recognition from whites. However,
it endorses an intra-racial heteronomy in which the conception of identity will be
contingent on recognition by other blacks. Moody-Adams's conception of self
sufficiency in regard to autonomy is misleading, as it appears to be as much group
contingent as it is self-contingent. It is based on the idea the affirmation of group
solidarity. If what makes Moody-Adams conception of black identity autonomous is that
one seeks to affirm that identity, then it is not clear why one affrrming a black identity
that seeks recognition from whites is not also an exercise of autonomy. As we later move
into the discussion of Appiah' s liberalism, we shall see that Appiah does not endorse a
group conception of autonomy, which Moody-Adams seems to be referring to when she
uses the term "self-sufficient." Rather, Appiah values individual autonomy, which is
why he attempts to remove race as a central identity in regard to the conception of self.
A second way in which Moody-Adams's conception of black identity fails to be
autonomous is in its commitment to race. Moody-Adams agrees that race is fictional.
However, under her view of black identity one's sense of self and life plans will still be
shaped by an allegiance to and membership in a group constituted as a race. Indeed, the
concept ofrace is needed to bind the common objects of black solidarity. Moody-Adams
might argue that what binds persons together in this regard is shared experience and
circumstances. She certainly makes this appeal. However, this is not the only appeal that
she makes. It was not a requirement that persons share the same experiences with the
persons that they seek to help. She also does not assert shared experiences would be
what constitutes a black identity. Rather, she suggests that as successful blacks or as
blacks that recognize the social and historical contingency of racism, they can help
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persons trapped by their oppositional racial identities and their circumstances. She does
not assert that blacks free themselves from racial categorization. To the contrary, she
presents the affirmation of racial solidarity as autonomous action. Not only does this not
seem to escape the charge that_ this is merely an example of collective heteronomy, but it
also objectionable on the grounds that it does free persons from the fiction of race .
Despite these objections to Moody-Adams position, it may be possible that, once
again, such non-essentialist conceptions of racial identity could fall under Appiah ' s
assertion that racial identities may be a "historically" and "strategically necessary" step
moving beyond racism. 100 Appiah's position is that racial identities can be useful, but the
process of identification is potentially hazardous. Therefore, we should be cautious when
utilizing racial identities.
Moody-Adams position appears to require that persons seek respect from blacks
as blacks as opposed to attempting to gain recognition from whites. I will now argue,
however, that this "self-sufficient" concept of black identity is actually inherently
oppositional. Moody-Adams version of black identity is an attempt to battle racial
injustice, as I have attempted to demonstrate, by an appeal to race. A problem is that her
view is that offers a conception of race that attempts to avoid seeking recognition from
whites while it inadvertently affirms white identity as the standard identity. The grounds
for solidarity are shared race as blacks, shared experiences as blacks, and shared cultural
products as blacks even if non-blacks share some of the same experiences, products, and
even in some circumstances racial identification. At the same time, Moody-Adam' s
racial identity asks that persons take a positive conception of identity or live a more
productive life as black people. The oppositional stance with this type of black identity is
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inherent in the need to make one 's allegiance to a particular racial group as opposed to
other racial groups. Her view differs from black identities that seek white recognition
because those identities, by seeking this recognition acknowledge that the racial structure
is hierarchical. Blacks historically have had to seek recognition and respect as blacks
from whites to fight racial injustice.
To better understand the oppositional nature ofboth of these conceptions of black
identity let us imagine a team sports scenario, where team black identity represents the
team that is not doing so well at the expense or compared to the success of team white
identity, but who could be doing better in the competition. Team black identity, coached
by a person trained under a politics of recognition, is going to work very hard to either
beat team white identity or demonstrate that their team is recognized as being worthy of
sharing the field with team white identity. In this example, the opponent is clear and so is
the higher status of that opponent. On the other hand, if Michelle Moody-Adams were
the coach of team black identity, she is going to focus on making sure that her players are
able to compete to the best of their ability, that they play as a team, while making sure
that they understand that they are in an unfair competition. In this example, there is no
appeal to hierarchy. There is also no obvious opponent. However, by recognizing the
fact that they are a team and that they are in a competition implies that there is indeed
opposition.
It is not even certain that either conception of racial identity could be effective in
a society that clearly favors some identities over others. With both types of racial identity
that I have just discussed, whites will likely remain to some degree as a privileged other
as they are both the comparison group while also being the ones for whom the terms of
the comparison are dictated. Something that exacerbates the problem of racial identities
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is the fact both of these models do not address the fact that whites are treated as
individuals in American society; each begins with a moral blank slate. The actions of
white individuals generally have no bearing on the moral or social status of whites writ

large. The creation of a hierarchical and oppositional race categorization system denied
phenotypically marked persons an individual moral status. It does not seem plausible that
hierarchical and/or oppositional racial identities can be successful in dismantling the
system by affirming the values that they seek overthrow. Furthermore, even if Moody
Adams' s version ofracial identity avoided racialist pitfalls like the problem of
authenticity, there is the potential that unhealthy loyalties surface-loyalties based on the
shared experience of oppression in a society where it still may be held that there is an
oppressor. These potential opposition-based loyalties could come to mirror ones found in
circumstances of ethnic, political, and religious unrest where shared experience,
ideologies, geography, have, at their most extreme, led to loss of life.
A final problem with Moody-Adams 's approach is that it does not differ
significantly from assertions of collective racial responsibility such as demonstrated by
the Million Man March. These approaches require that blacks collectively pull
themselves up by their bootstraps. The problem with these types of models is that it
affirms racist thinking by asserting that responsibility for the group's circumstances
ultimately falls on the group itself Therefore, this conception of black identity would ask
blacks take up the burdens brought about by racialist thinking.
There is certainly nothing wrong with helping others endure the trials that will
occur as a result of racialism-encouraging others to choose productive paths over more
destructive ones, teaching other persons to recognize racial contingency, and presenting
role models to counter perilous stereotypes. However, should this responsibility fall on
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blacks? Ifwe value autonomy, should we ask people to be activists for circumstances
beyond their control and by virtue of their designated race? Under Appiah' s view
racialism is inherited and accompanies racist thinking. The result is the suppression of
individual autonomy by means of subjugation, discrimination, and the limitations of
options that occur as the result of racial identification--all of these are validated and
justified by the fiction of race. Why, then, should we regard it as productive to ask
blacks, as a result of their given "black identity," to take such heavy responsibility of
bootstrapping themselves as a group out of this condition? Appiah's approach allows us
to question the validity of the racial paradigm in the first place, thereby destroying the
constructs of such a paradigm in hopes of making such ad hoc approaches to the
consequences of racialism unnecessary. The need for normative identities arose as a
result of the creation of a racial paradigm. These identities were specifically created to
address the concerns and consequences of racism. If Appiah' s assertion that racist
attitudes will dissipate with "the biological category of Negro" is correct, then black
identities like the ones offered by Michelle Moody-Adams, would become obsolete. 1 0 1
Section 2.4: Kittrell on Appiah's Normative Project

In this Chapter, I have examined Paul C. Taylor's criticisms of Appiah's
analytical project and both Taylor's and Michelle Moody-Adams' s criticisms of the
normative conclusions of Appiah's theory. Elsewhere in this essay, I have offered my
own criticism of Appiah's methodology, specifically, that his theory is in serious need of
an inheritance theory. Now, I offer a final criticism of his assertion that racial identities
might be a necessary transition towards this end of racism.

101

CoR p.49

57

As I have shown, Appiah successfully argues that race is a myth based on
metaphysical fictions. Given this fact, racial identities for the purpose of reconciliation,
even if only temporary, seems to 1) be a morally unreasonable accommodation for those
who have trouble accepting that race does not exist, 2) be a prolonging of what should
occur as a result of our identities being freed of racialism and 3) allow the business of
race to proceed as usual in America even if ad hoc remedies for racial problems are being
given.
Recall from Chapter 1 that for Appiah racial identity is a label that is "associated
with ascriptions by most people (where ascription involves descriptive criteria for
applying the label) ." 102 Furthermore, if you are ascribed a collective identity as black
American, then you acquire a set of rules governing your behavior or "scripts." Appiah
acknowledges that scripts are a feature of all collective identities. 1 03 Even racial
identities that can exist without an appeal to racial essences will carry racial scripts based
on a falsehood--race. Yet, Appiah reluctantly endorses these identities. I argue that it is
risky, at best, to embrace these identities that hold such powerful influences on society
even if they might have some type of positive normative value.
As an example let us imagine the following: a small group of persons with brown
eyes are placed in a commune of green-eyed people. The green-eyed people assign
themselves identity G and label persons with brown eyes as having identity B. Those
assigned identity B are also assigned a morally significant set of characteristics that are
considered entailed by that identity. Eventually, the two groups begin to form intra
group bonds, so much so that life choices made by members of each group are informed
1 02
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consciously and unconsciously by appeals to group membership. So, persons with
identity B now have identities and conceptions of self that are distinct from those who
hold identity G. The assignment of identity B was act of opposition and therefore identity
B inherently oppositional. This identity has intra-group importance, as it is a significant

reason why two brown-eyed persons identify with one another rather persons with green
eyes. Therefore, we can say that the assignment of identities connects individuals to
similarly assigned persons. Finally, membership in the group that holds identity B has an
effect on the way that persons with that identity view themselves as individuals by
shaping their wants, desires, values. Both their intra-social communal bonds with
members sharing identity B and their inter-social differences with persons that have
identity G reinforce these wants, desires, and values. It should be clear that identities as
laid out here would ultimately have consequences for both groups. However, for persons
with identity B, the negative consequence will be more overt and potentially more
detrimental.
Now let us take this analogy a step further. Let us say that both group G and
group B discover that there are no real intrinsic differences between them; that is, the
basis G-B dichotomy is false. This does not mean that groups G and B, the institutions
and lingering animosities created as a result of the assignment of identity will
immediately dissipate. The question here is: What is the best course of action to facilitate
solidarity between the two groups divided as a result of falsehood? Appiah would argue
that collective identities are a temporarily suitable means to help this eventual unity. I
contend, however, that it is morally unfair to . endorse that the agents continue to
internalize the false identities, even restructured non-essentialist versions, by continuing
to appeal to such identities beyond the purposes of 1) sharing experiences or 2) pointing
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out systematic injustices that have occurred as a result of creation of the dichotomy. Use
of racial identity in this regard is merely a matter of reporting facts rather than
affirmation of the racial structure. It does not require that we keep race as central to our
sense of self. Rather, it allows us to explain and understand the racial paradigm so that
we can best come up with a means to disassemble it.
However, a view suggesting that people utilize such identities when it may not be
necessary and when the underlying foundations of these identities are falsehoods is
morally flawed. One can argue that permitting such identities to exist and requiring them
to exist are different things. Substantively, these are actions are quite different.
However, the result of these actions is the same if it means that racial identities continue.
The existence of these identities may mean remedying the consequences of the racial
system, but it affirms the status quo at is very foundations. By doing so it makes the task
of removing race as central to our identities slower and more difficult as well as
facilitating an environment where new racial injustices may begin to spawn.
I contend that there needs to be an alternative means to racial identity that will
bring about an end to racism. At its best, racial -identity will only act as a treatment for
the symptoms of a deadly cancer rather than a cure. The goal then, should be not to
simply dismantle the structure created by fictions, but also to collectively dispose of these
fictions--the fictions that are the underlying causes for racism. Requiring persons and
governments to acknowledge that oppression occurred as a result of fiction takes away
the justifications to continue with the status quo. Furthermore, it gives justification to
remedy injustice that has occurred as result of the fiction by exposing the problem as a
societal or cultural problem, rather than one limited to the confines of particular groups.
In other words, collective responsibility in regard to racial justice extends to all social
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members and all of our institutions. Given Appiah 's reluctance to endorse these racial
identities, there is little doubt that he understands that social change should not simply be
put in the hands of groups that he seeks to dismantle. However, it is neither efficient nor
reasonable to allow past structures to continue when there is another optional available.
In sum, this option is to take Appiah' s eliminativism to its full conclusion; that is, not
simply to decentralize race from our identities, rather to push for its removal from our
conception of personhood.
The risk of not removing race will be that the process of racial identification may
begin to re-secure intra-racial bonds created as a result of racialism. These bonds can
give new life to and re-codify themselves. There has been evidence of this occurrence
historically. Two examples are the Black Nationalist and Afrocentric movements, which
support the idea of racial identities, and arose as a rejection of both negative racialist
notions ( about blacks) and as a response to the mistreatment that occurred as a result of
such notions. While both of these movements eventually dissipated, the reactionary
racialism trickled down into the black masses. Where racial and ideological walls should
have broken, the racialist foundations were reinforced. The result is that philosophers
like Appiah are left in the position of having to convince both whites AND blacks that
race is a social construction built on a foundation of racialism. Given this difficulty,
Appiah should avoid accommodation and instead affrrm what he asserts to be true, that
"there are no races." 1 04 Hence, he should stress that racial identities are neither the
temporary nor ultimate solution to the problem of racialism. Rather, only the rejection of
race will do.
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Any solution that requires that persons maintain identities is only likely to
reaffirm the status quo. This is especially true in the contemporary context, in which
ideas of "whiteness" and "blackness" are not only accepted but also often celebrated in
mainstream American culture. If ideas such as these prevail, even without racialism, they
will likely gamer a new set of commitments, new terms of authenticity, and a murkier
groundwork for a re-emergence of racism. The possibility of a non-essentialist
conception of racial identity without potentially dangerous life scripts that takes
autonomy seriously is dubious. If it is possible, then neither Appiah, Taylor, nor Moody
Adams have demonstrated it. Appiah's tentative suggestion that we move beyond
collective identities suggests that such a conception of identity would be difficult.
Furthermore, he fails to demonstrate why collective racial identities might be necessary.
Considering the above, perhaps a non-racial conception of personhood is ultimately the
key to bringing about an end to racial injustice.
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Chapter 3 : The Moral and Political Liberalism of K. Anthony Appiah
Section 3.1: Introduction
In this previous section, I have considered several criticisms ofAppiah's theory.
It is now important that we attempt to establish a better understanding ofAppiah's theory
by exploring some substantive foundations and the motivations of his philosophical
endeavor. In the following sections, I will briefly explore the primary foundations
underlying Appiah's nonnative conclusions about race; that is, a commitment to moral
and political liberalism.
Section 3.2: Appiah's Liberal Principles
There are several elements that are crucial in attempting to understand Appiah's
liberalism. These are the values of identity, self-creation, individuality, and dignity. We
have already talked at some length about identities; remember, that there are two
dimensions of identity: personal (intelligent, kind, etc) and collective (race, gender,
sexuality). Appiah holds that identities are constituted in social life. 1 05 In Appiah's
liberal vision, the idea of identity is synonymous with a "plan of life." For Appiah, a plan
of life does not resemble "an architects plan." Rather he states, "a plan of life is more like
a set of distinctive and organizing aims--aims within which you can fit your daily choices
and long-term vision." 1 06 In other words, an identity will not tell us how to live our lives.
Rather, it will supply us with a framework and tools with which we can direct our lives.
The concept of self-creation refers to our ability to construct our own lives by
choosing from the various identities that our social world makes available to us through
our personal lives, family, and society. This self-creation acts as an expression of our
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individuality, because we choose identities freely and for ourselves. The ideals of self
creation and individualism constitute what I take to be Appiah's conception of autonomy,
the idea of self-governing. Appiah endorses liberalism because it "takes this picture
seriously and tries to construct a society which is possible." 1 07
It would be a mistake to think Appiah rejects all collective identities, especially
not the ones in which you have choices and the ability to control. However, he states, "if
the criteria for ascribing a certain identity include things over which you have no control
as is the case with race, gender and sexual orientation-then whether you identify with
that identity. . . is not only up to you." 1 08 As we have seen, the problem with a collective
identity such as race is that it tends to take control over other identities (by altering their
scripts) and by limiting our ability to even choose identities. Given Appiah's
commitments to the liberal values that I have given, coupled with the nature of dangerous
collective identities, Appiah's reluctance to fully endorse racial identities is made more
lucid. Simply put, these types of racial identities are illiberal insofar as they limit our
autonomy. We do not control these identities. Rather, such identities control us tend to
control us.
A final value for Appiah is the idea of dignity, or respect. 1 09 This respect would
entail an appreciation for the other values. He states, " . . . there is something that holds
together our liberal ideals. That is the idea of the dignified life . . . . individuality is part of
any such life and that that is one reason why we should have liberal and political
institutions in a liberal society. " 1 1 ° For Appiah, the racialist blueprint is in itself illiberal
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because it fails to tak e id entities seriously; by its v ery nature it is incapable of d oing so.
If the conclusions that A ppiah mak es follow ing his analysis of racialism are tru e, then it
is clear that his commitment to L iberalism fu els his racial analysis.
The prev ious q uote d emonstrates that A ppiah' s liberal scope is limited not only to
the moral, but also to the political. R acialism has resulted in grav e inj ustices in A merican
society. A merica has a history of systematic di scrimination and political exclu sion.
W hile some of these injustices hav e been corrected, black s tod ay are still d isadv antaged
both politically and economically as a result of this historical legacy of racialism.
Furt hermore, the fact that most persons in A merican society still believ e in racialist
notions means that systematic racism w ill no d oubt continu e to be an in herent p art of our
political parad igm.
A ppiah attemp ts to combat racialism at its social found ations. H ow ev er, his
id eological marriage w ith notable liberal think er A my G utman n, fur ther d emons trates
that this battle must also tak e place at the political lev el. The theoretical alliance of these
tw o i ntellectuals also show s that A ppiah' s eliminativ ism need not thw art political
progr ess as Taylor suggests. R ather, as w e shall now see, its application at the political
lev el giv es clarity to w hat is need ed to secure social justice and fairn ess.
I n th e art icle "R esp ond ing to R acial I njustice" app earing in Color Conscious,
A my G utmann argues that we should ev aluate our p olitical institutions morally. She
hold s that the A merican institution is racially unjust toward s black s. Sh e asserts that
racial injustice is " not simply d eriv ativ e of economic and ed ucational injustice, howev er
much it is exacerbated by inj ustices in these realms." She goes on to say that "P rinciples
of economic and ed ucational eq uity therefore are inad eq uate to resolv e the problem of
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racial injustice." 1 1 1 Gutmann's concern here is that given the above conclusion, color
blind remedies are not going to be able to adequately serve the demands of justice. This is
because racial injustice stems from something that is more complex, deep, and divisive: a
still present racialism.
As I have stated Appiah focuses more directly on the personal and social sphere.
The crux of Gutmann's work can be seen as a continuation of Appiah's claim that we
move beyond identities; she commits to the political sphere drawing from the personal
and social spheres. In order to combat racialism she proposes what she calls "color
conscious" policies over color blind and race conscious policies. She states that color
consciousness,
". . . rejects race as an essential, natural division among human beings and also
rejects the idea that there are morally relevant differences that correspond to racial
division among human beings. Color consciousness entails an awareness of the
way in which individuals have historically come to be identified by superficial
phenotypical differences-such as skin color and facial features--that serve as the
bases for invidious discriminations and other injustices associated with race."

1 12

So, color conscious policies would take into account the racialism that Appiah has
stressed all along by recognizing that racialism is an inherent part of the way that racial
injustice has been carried out against blacks socially and economically. Gutmann
differentiates such a view from colorblind policies, which would not take race (and racial
injustice) into account or race consciousness, which presupposes the legitimacy of
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metaphysical racial classifications. 1 1 3 So, it is clear why Appiah would ally his theory
with Gutmann' s approach because it is consistent with his view that while race should not
have been be a factor in people's lives that racialism has affected persons negatively on
every level. In the epilogue of Color Conscious Appiah addresses the question of
whether government should be color blind by saying "That the reasonable answer is that
the government can't be color blind because society isn't. . . " 1 1 4 Adding Gutmann's
political dimension to Appiah's work is important. The overall result is a more holistic
vision that both exposes the root of racial inequalities and provides reconciliatory
methodology that does not require that we affirm the racial system.
Let us now return to Paul Taylor's final criticism from the previous section: that
Appiah's eliminativist view would facilitate the continued existence of unjust institutions
and that Appiah's view strips away the most efficient tool in fixing those institutions. As
demonstrated by Gutmann, a normative remedy does not require the use of racial
identities to be effective in combating the consequences of racialism nor does it entail
color-blind application at the political level. Furthermore, Appiah has shown his
commitment to the ideals of liberalism such as individuality, identity, justice and human
dignity. By allowing these ideals to be violated would be both morally irresponsible and
counterintuitive to his liberal vision. As I have shown in this Chapter, racial identities
pose a threat to these ideals. Therefore, what has been brought to light is that his
responsibility to liberal principles is his central foundation and thus provides a basis for
( l ) his exposition of the nature of the race concept, (2) his assertion that racial identities
would be a more efficient replacement for race, and (3) his statement that ultimately
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racial identities themselves could potentially stunt the flourishing that should be
promoted in the liberal democratic picture.
Appiah eloquently states, "I look forward to taking up, along with others, the
fruitful imaginative work of constructing co llective identities for a democratic nation in a
world of democratic nations; work that must go hand in hand with cultivating democracy
here and encouraging it elsewhere." 1 1 5 We see that in order to realize Appiah's most
important vision, we must move beyond our racial collective identities and take up a
more unified collective identity-one that we create, not that is assigned to us; that is, a
collective human identity. And, once we cease operating as a racially divided society we
can instead begin to lay foundations that will permit us to better acknowledge ourselves
as unified and democratic collective.
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Conclusion

Despi te the fact that evi d ence d oes not support the exi sten ce of human races, race
sti ll hol d s si gnifi cant meani ng i n the Ameri can consci ousness. R ace, oft en op erati ng
un d er the gui se of cul ture, i s sti l an infl uenti al and p atern ali sti c force in shapi ng our
liv es. O ur soci ety con ti nu es to gr ow i n i ts div ersi ty. H ow ev er, i f w e are to liv e i n
harmon y, to expect fairn ess and j usti ce i n our cultural , soci al , and p oli ti cal in sti tuti ons,
w e n eed to ask ourselv es: d o w e seek to resembl e a heterogeneous sal ad i n a bowl , or d o
w e seek i nstead to be the homogenous i ngredi ents of the great mel ti ng p ot that thi s
country cl ai ms to be? I f w e d esire the former then p erhap s w e need to mai ntain the
raci ali st currency thatw e hav e been giv en-t he currency that pi ts us agai nst each other
soci all y, poli ti call y, p ersonally, an d metap hysi call y. I f our answ er i s the l atter, then,
perhap s, w e n eed to consi d er changi ng out our exi sti ng curren cy. T hen w e can create a
new on e that al low s us to recov er from our curr ent soci al , p oli ti cal an d moral d efici t.
I n thi s essay, I hav e expl ored the analyti cal exami nati on and d econstructi on of
race i n W estern soci ety, by Kw ame Anthony Appi ah. H e has attemp ted to d emon strate
that our mod em con cep ti on of race w as in heri ted from a tradi ti on of metap hysi cal
essenti ali sm that w as able to emerge ov er other form s of race talk of the d ay. I hav e
argued that Appi ah's approach i s successfu l i n w hat i t seek s to accompli sh d espi te havi ng
d efici enci es. Appi ah's app roach i s effectiv e i n und ermi ni ng raci ali st thinkin g because
rather than i nv esti ng ti me and energy in challengi ng the conseq uences of raci ali st
thinki ng, i t attemp ts to uncov er the truth that raci ali sm has so fa r been mask ed i n
Ameri can soci ety- that races d o not exi st ap art from our i d eas and human constru cti on.
W hil e thi s cl ai m i s certai nly not a new clai m i n the w orl d of cri ti cal race theory, Appi ah
i s uniq ue i nsofar as he recogni zes that the long life giv en to race i s n ot one that can
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simply be frustrated by appeals to science, class, nor can it be explained away by a socio
historical approach. Race has prevailed over these adversaries historically because they
have failed to consider the less apparent collusions at its core-racialism: a mixed bag of
faulty science, inductive assumptions, biased anthropology and elusive metaphysics. In
uncovering these aspects Appiah has had great success.
Now we can ask the questions "Will we . . . . " or "How will we unravel ourselves
from racialist entanglement?" I have suggested in this essay, that we should move
completely beyond an appeal to race for our answers and moved towards recognizing our
racial contingencies and attempt to pack race away with the other chimeras and goblins of
our metaphysical histories. Then and only then will there be hope that we can forge our
own identities free from the binds of race. How can we do this? I contend that it is time
to do what there seemingly has not been any attempt to do in our racialism-laden
society-we should expose the fictions of race to the masses by means such
demonstrating its history as Appiah has done. We should end our reluctance to let go of
racialism by unleashing the knowledge that has been accepted by sciences: there are no
races. It may mean that we leave the ivory tower for this important issue. However, until
this mission is completed, ad hoc solutions to racial problems will largely will be
rendered ineffective, barely making a dent, and falling on mostly deaf ears. Meanwhile,
we will still be left with our fictionally based conception of racial personhood. People
will go on with their lives denying themselves the ability to construct their life plans,
attempting to live up to expectations of their designated categories, concealing from
themselves what in Appiah 's view are of the most fundamental values of liberalism--
autonomy and human dignity. For now, we can share with Appiah a cautious optimism
and remember that we are made not of one, but many identities. We can tuck away into
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our consciousness that "Racial identity can be the basis of resistance to racism; but even
as we struggle against racism--and though we have made great progress, we have further
still to go-let us not let our racial identities subject us to new tyrannies." 1 1 6
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